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Buddhism Is True. Wright uses evolutionary psychology to 
legitimize a naturalistic version of modern North American 
Buddhism. I argue that evolutionary psychology is not 
the right framework for understanding the human mind 
or the right framework for relating science to Buddhism, 
that naturalistic Buddhism is not compelling because it 
distorts the normative and soteriological commitments 
of Buddhism, and that the question “Is Buddhism true?” 
is not the right one to ask when “truth” is understood as 
“scientific truth.” 
CHAPTER THREE: NO SELF? NOT SO FAST 
I argue for two principal claims concerning how to relate 
the Buddhist theory of no-self to cognitive science and 
contemporary philosophy. First, cognitive science does 
not indicate that the self is an illusion; it suggests that it 
is a construction. So when Buddhist modernists claim that 
science demonstrates the truth of the Buddhist view that 
there is no self, they are mistaken. Second, it is facile to 
think that the Buddhist no-self theorists are superior to 
the Brahminical self-theorists in being more “scientific” 
or rational and empirical. The Brahminical theorists are 
just as committed to rational and empirical inquiry as the 
Buddhists. So Buddhist exceptionalism—that Buddhism is 
superior in being uniquely scientific—is unwarranted. 
CHAPTER FOUR: MINDFULNESS MANIA 
I argue against two widespread ideas about mindfulness 
meditation practices. One is that mindfulness is essentially 
an inward awareness of one’s own private mental theater. 
The other is that the best way to understand the effects 
of mindfulness practices is to look inside the head at the 
brain. Instead, I argue that the cognitive capacities on 
which mindfulness relies are metacognitive and belong to 
social cognition, that mindfulness consists in the integrated 
exercise of a host of cognitive, affective, and social skills 
in situated action, that brain processes are necessary 
enabling conditions of mindfulness but are only partially 
constitutive of it, and that they become constitutive only 
given the wider context of embodied and embedded 
cognition and action. 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE RHETORIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 
This chapter targets the Buddhist modernist idea of 
“awakening” or “enlightenment,” understood as a kind of 
nonconceptual insight or epiphany, or as a scientifically 
comprehensible psychological state with identifiable 
neural correlates (or as both). I argue that enlightenment 
is an ambiguous concept, that what it refers to is not a 
singular state, and that its many Buddhist meanings are 
often incompatible. Enlightenment is concept-dependent 
in the sense that any experience called an “enlightenment 
experience” is concept-dependent. So the idea that some 
state could inherently be an enlightenment state outside of 
concepts, language, history, and tradition makes no sense. 
CHAPTER SIX: COSMOPOLITANISM AND
CONVERSATION 
This chapter discusses philosophical cosmopolitanism, 
especially in the context of the Buddhism-science 
dialogue. I argue that the cosmopolitanist viewpoint, as 
sketched above in the overview, provides a better way for 
us to appreciate the Buddhist intellectual tradition and its 
importance today than does Buddhist modernism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is not uncommon for engagements with Buddhism to be 
motivated by the conviction that its various claims about 
the mind, knowledge, and the nature of reality are, in 
effect, true. In such instances, “Buddhist” can sometimes 
attach to those with expertise in, say, Abhidharma in 
the same way that “Catholic” can attach to Thomists. 
My general impression, however, is that, at least among 
philosophers of European descent, the label indicates 
expertise rather than conviction (the two, of course, are 
not mutually exclusive). And while there are many reasons 
why one might not want to be associated with the object of 
one’s scholarly endeavors, two in particular stand out. First, 
since scholarship in the humanities and social sciences is 
not incompatible with upholding a particular religious or 
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ideological view, one might want to avoid getting boxed in 
as a doctrinaire thinker. Second, the ascendency of science 
and the scientific method as the most effective way to gain 
reliable knowledge means that traditional religions have 
had to adapt and seek new relevance, often by claiming 
to be the repositories of wisdom or knowledge that falls 
outside the purview of science. And few have been more 
successful in responding to this challenge than Buddhism. 
Of course, Buddhism’s encounter with modernity tells a 
complex story of adaptation and change.2 But the global 
explosion of the mindfulness movement in recent decades, 
backed by a cross section of the scientific and religious 
studies establishment, means that large segments of the 
educated public now regard Buddhism as a tradition that, 
in effect, has got its principles and methods right. 
This new brand of recognizably Buddhist apologetics 
cloaked in a scientific aura is the second reason why one 
might deliberately resist the label “Buddhist.” It is also 
the main reason behind Evan Thompson’s new book, 
Why I Am Not a Buddhist, a refreshing, original, and 
insightful contribution to our understanding of “Buddhist 
modernism,” the now widely shared belief that Buddhism 
is a kind of science of the mind whose insights have 
been experimentally tested and confirmed over millennia 
through meditative practice. There is much that Thompson 
and I agree on about the best way to engage Buddhism 
and bring it into dialogue with contemporary thought. But 
since my role here is that of a critic, I will focus on two 
areas where, I think, most of our disagreements lie: (i) 
the suitability of evolutionary psychology as a framework 
of analysis for Buddhist moral psychological ideas and 
(ii) whether a Madhyamaka-inspired anti-foundationalist 
stance can serve as an effective platform for debating the 
issue of progress in science. 
II. BUDDHISM AND EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY: MATCHING PARTNERS OR
INCOMPATIBLE BEDFELLOWS? 
Critics of Buddhist modernism have so far argued that the 
seemingly self-evident claims made about Buddhism— 
that it is not a religion but a practical guide to living, that 
it is a method of self-analysis compatible with modern 
psychology, that it is egalitarian and democratic, and that 
meditation is its core practice—are a modern construct.3 
Thompson’s contribution to this critique has two primary 
targets: (i) the mindfulness movement, which is inspired 
by, and strongly endorses, neuroessentialism or the view 
that the best and most definitive way to explain human 
psychology is by reference to the brain and its activity; 
and (ii) the evolutionary psychology paradigm used to 
legitimize a naturalized version of Buddhism favored by 
many Europeans and North Americans, as found, inter alia, 
in Robert Wright’s best-selling Why Buddhism Is True. I 
think Thompson is spot-on in his assessment of Buddhist 
modernism as an ideological expression of the mindfulness 
movement. But his critical stance on evolutionary 
psychology and the project of naturalizing Buddhism is 
less convincing. Indeed, much of Thompson’s critique of 
Buddhist modernism turns on his rejection of some of the 
foundational premises of evolutionary psychology. And 
he takes issues with those who appeal to evolutionary 
psychology as the right framework for relating Buddhism 
to science. Is he right? Undoubtedly, as an enterprise 
that attempts to explain most mental traits as adaptations 
or functional products of natural selection, evolutionary 
psychology is not without controversy. But Thompson, I 
will argue, relies on some common misconceptions about 
the field and its overly critical reception, mainly among 
philosophers of biology. 
First, Thompson argues that evolutionary psychologists 
operate with a skewed conception of evolution, which 
regards organisms “as passive recipients or passive effects 
of natural selection” (65). A better alternative, he suggests, 
is to regard organisms as able to “exert an influence over 
their own evolution by actively shaping their environments” 
(65)—an idea favored by what evolutionary ecologists call 
“niche construction theory” (65). But this way of framing the 
issue plays on a misconception that evolution and adaptive 
behavior or learning represent different explanations. To 
claim that some traits—for instance, the human fear of 
snakes—are evolved does not mean they are present at 
birth. Rather, it is to claim that humans have an evolved 
learning mechanism that makes it more easily in their 
case to acquire a fear of snakes than of other things in the 
environment. Furthermore, learning itself is enabled by 
neurocognitive processes that are themselves the product 
of evolution. 
Consider perception, one of the modalities by which we 
learn to navigate the environment. In order to understand 
how perception works, we must look to the causal 
processes that have configured our perceptual systems. 
While cats and human infants have similar perceptual 
systems, the difference between the way cats and human 
infants perceive is largely a function of their evolved brain-
based mechanisms. Lastly, evolution and learning operate 
at different levels of explanation. In the middle of the last 
century, Ernst Mayr suggested that we understand biology 
as an enterprise in the pursuit of two sets of questions: 
(i) proximate, concerned with the matter of structure 
and mechanism (that is, with the immediately preceding 
mechanisms that lead an organism to do what it does on 
a given occasion); and (ii) ultimate, concerned with why 
organisms are the way they are (that is, why organisms tend 
to have a system that responds that way).4 Mayr thought 
the former were the province of functional biologists, 
while evolutionary biologists were mainly concerned with 
the latter, even though the study of adaptive functions of 
traits is central to evolutionary explanations. The confusion 
these notions created led the ethologist Niko Tinbergen 
to frame biology as actually concerned with four types of 
questions, now known as “Tinbergen’s Four Questions.”5 
Two are about ontogeny (How does a specific trait develop 
in individuals?) and mechanism (What is the structure of 
the trait?). The other two are about phylogeny (What is the 
trait’s evolutionary history?) and adaptive significance (How 
have trait variations influenced fitness?)6 Although these 
two sets of questions may lead to conflicting explanations, 
they are not necessarily incompatible: To single out a 
specific trait as a product of evolution says nothing about 
how the organism exhibiting that trait will behave during its 
lifespan. For instance, in the case of some butterfly pupae 
turning brown rather than green, we can tell a story about 
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how a shortened photoperiod leads to the release of a 
chemical that turns off the green pigment. But we can also 
say that butterflies have this system because butterflies 
that lack it would have produced green pupae in the winter, 
which would have resulted in higher rates of predation. 
Second, Thompson thinks evolutionary psychologists 
unfairly privilege one period in our evolutionary history— 
the Pleistocene—“as the source of all our important 
psychological adaptations” (65), downplaying the role 
that cultural transmission has played in human evolution. 
As an alternative proposal, he suggests that “gene-culture 
coevolution theory” (65) is better suited to show how 
“changes in genes can lead to changes in culture, which 
can then influence genetic selection” (66). In Thompson’s 
view, making room for the “cultural transmission of tools 
and concepts” and the “inheritance of culturally shaped 
environments” (66) gives this theory an added explanatory 
advantage. But this alternative proposal begs the 
question: If our ability to act in ways that go beyond our 
genetic heritage is not itself a product of evolution, then 
where does this ability come from? Tools and concepts 
have certainly served as proximate factors of cultural 
transmission, but our ability to fashion them and to adopt 
behaviors in keeping with their function must itself have 
been made possible by the forces of evolution. Of course, 
not all aspects of human behavior fit neatly the current 
approach favored by evolutionary psychologists. But 
progress in explaining a wide range of human behavior, 
from parenting7 and cooperation8 to perception9 and cross-
cultural differences in social behavior,10 mitigates against 
this wholesale dismissal of evolutionary psychology as a 
deeply flawed enterprise. 
Third, Thompson targets the hypothesis, favored by many 
evolutionary psychologists, that the mind has a modular 
cognitive architecture composed of computational 
processes that are innate adaptations. He thinks there is no 
evidence from neuroscience in support of this hypothesis. 
Against the evolutionary psychology hypothesis that 
cognition is mostly domain-specific, Thompson proposes 
that we interpret the evidence from neuroscience as 
providing support for an alternative hypothesis, namely, 
one that regards brain areas and networks as specialized for 
performing “a variety of functions depending on the context” 
(67) and as exhibiting “flexible tendencies to respond across 
a wide range of circumstances and tasks” (68). Whereas the 
massive modularity hypothesis puts forward an image of 
the mind as modular through and through—including both 
low-level systems underlying perception and language 
and high-level systems responsible for reasoning and 
decision-making—the alternative, emergentist hypothesis 
that Thompson favors understands cognition as a function 
of dynamic interactions among various modules, not as a 
result of their activation. In short, there are no “dedicated, 
special-purpose cognitive modules instantiated in specific 
brain structures” (69) of the sort evolutionary psychologists 
assume to be the case. 
But this way of framing the issue glosses over a rich history 
of debate in both cognitive science and the philosophy 
of mind going back to Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The 
Modularity of Mind, which first introduced the term 
“module” and its cognates. As that debate shows, the 
question of the modularity of the mind is far from settled. 
For advocates of the massive modularity hypothesis,11 the 
advantage modular systems have over their alternatives 
lies in their problem-solving capacity. That is, adaptive 
problems are more readily and efficiently solved by 
modular systems than by non-modular systems, which 
explains why evolution has favored this type of cognitive 
architecture.12 Critics of the hypothesis single out things 
like neuroplasticity,13 high-level cognitive capacities 
such as mind-reading,14 and positive correlations among 
ostensibly distinct cognitive abilities15 as evidence against 
the view that the mind essentially consists of a collection 
of distinct and adaptively specialized modules for different 
cognitive tasks. But even critics often concede that 
despite the ensuing debate, the concept of modularity 
has wide relevance beyond cognitive science and the 
philosophy of mind. Indeed, in epistemology, it is often 
“invoked to defend the legitimacy of a theory-neutral type 
of observation, and hence the possibility of some degree 
of consensus among scientists with divergent theoretical 
commitments.”16 
Fourth, Thompson joins the chorus of critics who point 
out that the hypotheses of evolutionary psychology aren’t 
confirmed by evolutionary biology. The problem, in this 
case, is said to lie in their approach. That is, “evolutionary 
psychologists look for what they consider to be design in 
the makeup of our psychological traits and then present 
a scenario involving natural selection that would have 
led to the formation of those traits” (69). What makes this 
approach problematic, according to critics, is a series 
of mistaken assumptions: (i) that all traits have evolved 
by natural selection; (ii) that adaptations are properly 
defined as traits; and (iii) that certain cognitive traits 
can be shown to be widespread in human beings with 
the right experimental framework (70). But this way of 
framing the debate paints evolutionary psychologists as 
something they explicitly are not: genetic determinists.17 
As evolutionary psychologists such as Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby make quite clear, evolutionary psychology 
is not behavioral genetics: “Behavior geneticists are 
interested in the extent to which differences between 
people in a given environment can be accounted for 
by differences in their genes. Evolutionary psychologists 
are interested in individual differences only insofar as 
these are the manifestation of an underlying architecture 
shared by all human beings.”18 This underlying architecture 
is what mediates an organism’s phenotypic expression, 
which in turn can be explained in terms of adaptations 
that were selected for, which are present because they 
are in turn causally coupled to traits. The question is not 
whether genes or the environment are more (or less) 
important in determining an organism’s phenotype. 
Rather, as Cosmides and Tooby clarify, “[e]very aspect of 
an organism’s phenotype is the joint product of its genes 
and its environment. To ask which is more important is like 
asking, Which is more important in determining the area of 
a rectangle, the length or the width? . . . Genes allow the 
environment to influence the development of phenotypes” 
but “what effect the environment will have on an organism 
depends critically on the details of its evolved cognitive 
architecture.”19 
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As for the view that evolutionary hypotheses are mainly 
post-hoc storytelling or “just-so” stories—a seemingly 
unscientific process of noticing something special about 
human behavior, concocting a convenient (readevolutionary) 
explanation about it, and defending the explanation 
without further experimental work—the response from 
evolutionary psychologists is quite categorical: This is 
nothing but a widespread misconception. While it is true 
that generating a hypothesis without deriving or testing 
any new predictions based on it might open one to the 
charge of just-so storytelling, as I noted above, evolutionary 
psychologists have made progress in explaining a wide 
range of human behavior.20 Part of the problem is that 
critics assume scientific enterprises that have a historical 
component such as evolutionary psychology somehow 
trade in unfalsifiable hypotheses. But if that were the case, 
the hypotheses of all scientific disciplines with a historical 
component—e.g., astrophysics, cosmology, and geology— 
would amount to nothing more than just-so storytelling. 
The crucial point is to generate novel predictions about 
previously unobserved phenomena “that can be tested 
in the present day.”21 Science, as we all know, is an open-
ended enterprise whose conclusions are subject to revision 
in light of new findings and better theorizing. 
Regardless of Thompson’s critical stance on the viability 
of evolutionary psychology as a scientific enterprise, it is 
a further question whether evolutionary psychology is an 
appropriate framework for relating Buddhism to science. 
The aggregate view of human experience, a focus on latent 
disposition as subpersonal or subconscious conduits 
to conscious cognition, and the paramount importance 
of causal rather than justificatory accounts of reasoning 
certainly speak in favor of this corroboration. Does that 
mean there is no room for competing approaches, 
specifically for the embodied and enactive cognitive 
science that Thompson favors? Certainly not. I myself have 
argued in favor of the usefulness of the latter in accounting 
for certain aspects of the Buddhist epistemological 
account of perception, attention, and reasoning.22 Whether 
naturalistic Buddhism is compelling depends on whatever 
conception of naturalism is in play. A naturalism fine-tuned 
to accommodate mental phenomena is precisely what 
Varela’s neurophenomenological project23 advocates for in 
putting forth a vision of cognition as embodied, embedded, 
and enactive, and thus as seemingly continuous with the 
environment of which it is a part. 
Since Thompson has assiduously defended this vision in 
his work,24 he ought to find compelling a conception of 
naturalism that aligns Abhidharma Reductionism with the 
neurophenomenological enterprise. And, as his summation 
of the enactive approach testifies, it seems that he indeed 
does: “[C]ognition is embodied sense-making; it is the 
enactment or bringing forth of a lived world of meaning 
and relevance in and through embodied action. . . . Instead 
of applying a scientific framework to Buddhism from the 
outside, we engage in a two-way exchange with Buddhism, 
including developing a version of embodied cognitive 
science that incorporates ideas from Buddhist philosophy” 
(71-72). But in order to find out whether the proposal he 
puts forward is a viable one, we must consider two things: 
first, whether the school of thought Thompson turns to— 
that of Madhyamaka (Middle Way), associated with the 
Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 CE)— 
does indeed capture Buddhism’s core teachings; and 
second, whether that school of thought provides a viable 
framework for advancing positive knowledge claims about 
cognition and the mind. 
III. MADHYAMAKA AND THE REAL WORLD 
Madhyamaka metaphysics, as Thompson rightly points 
out, is anti-foundationalist: “Mādhyamikas argue that 
knowable phenomena are concept-dependent in this 
technical sense. This implies that it doesn’t make sense to 
think of knowledge as grasping how the world is in itself 
apart from the mind” (74). To think of human experience in 
Madhyamaka terms, then, is to think of its various cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral aspects as lacking any ultimate 
ground or foundation whatsoever: “Cognition as enaction 
means that cognition has no ground or foundation beyond 
its own history, which amounts to a kind of ‘groundless 
ground’” (74). That’s all fine and good. But Thompson 
does not understand his two-way exchange with Buddhism 
as a project in metaphysics simpliciter. Rather, the goal 
is to advance cognitive science in ways that can better 
account for human experience. So, the question is: Can 
Madhyamaka deliver? That is, does Madhyamaka provide 
the sort of stabilizing framework that allows for various 
theoretical perspectives (physics, biology, psychology, 
etc.) to be integrated into a unified worldview? 
The answer, in this case, is a categorical “no.” Let me 
explain. As a knowledge enterprise, science is predicated 
on a reliable method (the scientific method) and on open-
ended modes of inquiry that allow for its hypotheses to 
be falsified. Furthermore, the advancement of science 
has meant the diversification of explanatory frameworks 
to accommodate ever-expanding classes of observable 
phenomena. Biology alone now branches out into some two 
dozen subfields, including biophysics, evolution, genetics, 
and, most consequentially for our times, virology. Each one 
of these domains contributes to a burgeoning conceptual 
vocabulary that, in many cases, is domain-specific. Can an 
anti-foundationalist metaphysics contribute the kinds of 
hypotheses that would be required to ground scientific 
inquiry across various domains? 
Before venturing an answer, I need to clarify one important 
aspect of Madhyamaka, specifically its two truths doctrine. 
The general idea is that there is an ordinary, conventional 
way of seeing things, and an ultimate, correct way, which 
takes those things to be empty in the specific sense that they 
lack a nature of their own and are instead brought about by 
multiple causes and conditions. This way of mapping out 
the epistemic domain recalls Wilfrid Sellars’s conception of 
philosophy as the cultivation of a “stereoscopic vision” that 
takes in at once both the scientific and the manifest images 
of the world.25 
But the two truths framework is far more radical than it 
may seem at first blush. Conventionally speaking, there 
are tables and chairs and people. Ultimately, there are 
no such things, not because what we ordinarily call a 
chair is just some material (e.g., wood, plastic) arranged 
chairwise as a result of multiple causes and conditions, 
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but because no phenomena, in effect, come into being. 
As Nāgārjuna famously declares in his Foundation of the 
Middle Way Verses, to think of something “as produced 
by causes and conditions” is to think of it as a “product” 
(15.1cd). But something that is a product could not be a 
stable and intrinsically existent thing, for if it were, it 
would not be a product. Nor could its existence be due to 
extrinsic factors, “for an extrinsic nature is said to be the 
intrinsic nature of another existent” (15.3cd). And since 
“an existent is established given the existence of either 
intrinsic nature or extrinsic nature” (15.4cd), it follows that, 
absent these two singular ways to establish what exists, 
there can be no existent.26 That is, no phenomena either 
come into being or go out of existence. And if that wasn’t 
radical enough, consider the notion that commitment to “it 
exists” or “it does not exist” (15.7ab) with regard to any 
entity whatsoever is a slippery slope to either eternalism 
or nihilism, positions that a Mādhyamika strives to avoid by 
following the middle way.27 
Hence, from a Madhyamaka standpoint, there is no 
fundamental explanatory framework to account for the 
way different things (e.g., spacetime geometry, atoms, 
molecules, enzymes, honey bees) appear or function the 
way they do. If the ultimate truth is that no phenomena 
come into being as ordinarily conceived, then this is not 
something that can be conveyed in language. In short, the 
Madhyamaka standpoint—to the extent that “standpoint” 
can be coherently applied in this case—is that reality has 
an inarticulable structure. Specifically, Nāgārjuna thinks 
that the conceptual schema implicit in the commonsense 
view of the world presupposes the existence of a world of 
stable and self-sustaining objects and processes. Hence, 
his method consists in demonstrating that existential 
presuppositions about a world of such stable and self-
sustaining objects and processes are never true. To see 
things from the standpoint of ultimate truth is to call into 
question the conventions of our everyday world, including 
our understanding of causation as the relation that links 
objects and events, and ultimately to show them to be 
misleading.28 
This notion that ordinary objects and events, and the 
conventions we employ to assess their ontological status, 
are not what they seem to be when subjected to rigorous 
analysis should strike most readers as sensible enough. But 
as some have argued, in lacking a commitment to revising 
and reforming the conventional ways of seeing things, 
Madhyamaka falls short of allowing for sophisticated 
theoretical ideas and explanations of a scientific nature. Tom 
Tillemans makes this point quite clear while reflecting on 
an influential Madhyamika philosopher’s efforts to rescue 
conventional truth: “Saying, as does Candrakīrti repeatedly 
in debates with Sāmkhya and his fellow Buddhists, that rice
˙just leads to rice rather than barley, may well be a very good 
answer to the various metaphysicians who think either that 
the effect must really be present in the cause to ensure that 
causality is not haphazard or that cause and effect must be 
completely separate real entities. It is of course, however, 
a bad answer to a plant scientist inquiring about genetic 
features in rice that explain its growth, yield, color, form, 
resistance to disease, and so on.”29 In short, dumbed-down 
conventional truth of the sort Madhyamaka trades in was 
not terribly attractive even to fellow Buddhist thinkers and 
their historical rivals, let alone to scientifically informed and 
philosophically savvy modern audiences.30 
Given this unsophisticated conception of the conventional 
and the view of the ultimate as explanatorily inarticulable, 
there is little that Madhyamaka can contribute to debates 
about the best and most effective ways of mapping out 
a reality that is structured differently at different levels 
of organization. The problem for Madhyamaka is not just 
the inadequacy of its two truths framework. Rather, the 
dialectical progression leading up from conventional 
to ultimate truth itself is fraught. We can’t overcome the 
pure conventionalism of the first dialectical step without 
some epistemology.31 In short, claiming, as Madhyamika 
philosophers do, that the conventional level of truth and/or 
reality is empty won’t do, since such an assertion can only 
be made from the standpoint of the truth that defines the 
quality of being empty, and this assertion presupposes that 
one first gets the conventional right. And Madhyamaka, it 
seems, provides no resources (of a conceptual or any other 
sort) for achieving that goal; there is no master argument 
for emptiness. If the question of what counts as an oasis is 
not settled first, how is one to understand the difference 
between it and a mere mirage? Indeed, as Eviatar Shulman 
notes, “Nāgārjuna’s critique of any notion of existence is 
unrelenting; all bhāva, existence, must go. . . . This leaves 
him with very few positive things to say, aside from likening 
reality, or different aspects of reality, to illusions.”32 
I would suggest that the only way for Thompson to rescue 
his proposal is to abandon the cosmic illusionism of the 
Perfection of Wisdom literature and the Madhyamaka 
paradigm that grew out of it. In doing so, he would be 
in keeping both with the trajectory of Buddhist thought 
in India and with the unfolding of the scientific study of 
the mind for the past century and a half.33 It is, after all, 
common knowledge that Nāgārjuna’s writings and his 
concerted effort to discredit some of the fundamental 
concepts of Abhidharma had relatively little impact on the 
subsequent development of Buddhist thought in India 
(Abhidharma continued to flourish well into the second half 
of the first millennium with no perceived need on the part 
of Abhidharma thinkers to defend their theories against his 
criticism). Nor did Nāgārjuna’s radical critique of the very 
possibility of grounding knowledge in reliable sources have 
any impact on the epistemological agenda of Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti, which dominated Indian Buddhist intellectual 
circles and was engaged by Brahmanical philosophers well 
into the early modern period. Indeed, as Richard Hayes 
notes, “[a]side from a few commentators on Nāgārjuna who 
identified themselves as Mādhyamikas, Indian Buddhist 
intellectual life continued almost as if Nāgārjuna had never 
existed.”34 
These points of criticism aside, Why I Am Not a Buddhist 
should be welcomed as an invaluable and timely corrective 
to the ideological excesses of Buddhist modernism. As I see 
it, the book’s most important contribution lies in its rather 
unique vantage point. Thompson has been involved with 
the Mind and Life Institute (one of the key organizations 
responsible for spearheading the rapprochement between 
Buddhism and science) from its inception, and so he is in a 
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privileged position to reflect critically both on its successes 
and on its excesses. Over more than three decades, the 
Mind and Life Symposia have hosted large cohorts of 
scientists, philosophers, Buddhist scholars, and Tibetan 
contemplatives, all under the watchful eye of the Dalai 
Lama. Thompson’s own reportage on these intellectually 
stimulating but often ideologically motivated ventures 
is that of an insider concerned about having unwittingly 
participated in an enterprise aimed at remaking Buddhism 
in the image of modern science. And part of that mea 
culpa should be a celebration of Thompson’s prodigious 
and important work, which promotes a way of thinking that 
embodies the very best of cosmopolitan philosophy. 
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To be honest, I was a bit dismayed when I first learned the 
title of Evan Thompson’s latest book. It was not because I 
had previously thought he was a Buddhist (I didn’t think 
this). Nor was it because I believed one should be a Buddhist 
in order to engage insightfully and rigorously with Buddhist 
philosophy (I don’t believe this). It was because the title, Why 
I Am Not a Buddhist, invites speculation about the reasons 
why, and it seemed to me that the most natural speculation 
is that he thinks there is something wrong with Buddhism, 
and that if one accepts his reasons for rejecting it, one would 
reject it also.1 Now, there is nothing wrong with arguing 
against Buddhism. But I work in a discipline that is already 
indifferent to it (at best). Academic philosophy is one of the 
least diverse and inclusive fields in all of the humanities. 
Its professional culture does not value Buddhism. Those 
who work in this field must continually make the case 
for Buddhism’s relevance to contemporary philosophical 
concerns. Evan is highly regarded in this community. His 
work on 4E (embodied, enactive, embedded, extended) 
cognition is ground-breaking and has deeply penetrated 
the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. That his early 
writings relate this work to Buddhist philosophy has both 
promoted Buddhism as a worthy interdisciplinary partner 
and created new avenues of cross-cultural research. Evan’s 
scholarly engagement with Buddhism is also some of the 
clearest and best in the field. He’s one of my intellectual 
heroes and I’ve always considered him to be a great friend 
to Buddhist philosophy. For him now to be perceived as 
denouncing Buddhism and retreating from these earlier 
views creates a challenge for those following in his wake. 
It might appear that we’ve lost a champion, an influential 
one, and those already indifferent to Buddhism might take 
it as further reason not to engage with it at all. 
Now, of course, this is not what Evan argues in Why I Am Not
a Buddhist and is the very opposite of his intention. Evan
repeatedly insists that he is, and wishes to be, “a good
friend to Buddhism” (2, 189). “[I]t’s unquestionably true,” he
writes, “that Buddhism possesses a vast and sophisticated
philosophical and contemplative literature on the mind”
(37). He claims that “modern interpretations” of the
Buddhist denial of self have “reinvigorated contemporary
philosophical debates” and that this “confluence of cross-
cultural philosophy and cognitive science has proved
to be fertile for thinking about the self” (86). He also
defends a form of cosmopolitanism that includes Buddhist
philosophy as a conversational partner worthy of respectful
intellectual interest. But Evan ferociously denounces what
he calls ‘Buddhist modernism.’ The claims of Buddhist
modernism, he argues, are “biased” (104), “confused”
(18), “dubious” (22), “specious” (28), “nonsensical” (45),
“superficial” (119), “facile” (88), and “misguided” (121).
The arguments advanced in its support, Evan contends,
are based on limited concepts (36) and erroneous ideas
(64), involve conflation (20), and turn on distinctions that
are impossible to maintain (49). He concludes that the
core tenets of Buddhist modernism are “philosophically
and scientifically indefensible” (189) and so are to be
thoroughly rejected. 
Evan identifies Buddhist modernism as a view typical to 
Buddhist participants in the Mind and Life Dialogues with 
the Dalai Lama initiated by Francisco Varela. He argues that 
it is advanced by S. N. Goenka and presupposed by the 
vipassanā or insight meditation movement. And he locates 
it in the popular writings of several public intellectuals 
who promote Buddhism in relation to science. Buddhist 
modernism is no straw dummy. There is a genuine target 
for Evan’s critique. It is tempting to think, however, that 
academic cross-cultural Buddhist philosophy falls outside 
its purview. None of the Cowherds are explicitly mentioned 
or targeted, for instance.2 Nor are any well-regarded and 
philosophically trained Buddhist scholars.3 Moreover, 
according to Evan, a central tenet of Buddhist modernism 
is that Buddhism is superior to all other religions and, 
because of its unique rationalism and empiricism, counts 
as a science and not as a religion. While some academic 
Buddhist philosophers do discuss its methodological 
features and do reconstruct and defend naturalized forms 
of Buddhist thought, you rarely find them doing so in 
the service of this comparative and scientistic position. 
And that they take truth as their evaluative standard 
for defending Buddhist claims is surely not a flaw. But 
academic Buddhist philosophy does not get off so lightly. 
Evan includes Thomas Metzinger and Miri Albahari in the 
class of Buddhist modernists (106-110). Metzinger and 
Albahari are university-based academic philosophers. Does 
Evan think they are isolated cases that just happen to share 
the views that he critiques? Or does he think they exemplify 
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